UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ABDOLPH LEGER,

Plaintiff.

-against-

JUDGE JOHN HECHT, et al.,

Defendants.

25-CV-3088 (LTS)

TRANSFER ORDER

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at the Otis Bantum Correctional Center, brings this action *pro se*. Plaintiff asserts claims, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against judges, police officers, and lawyers, all in Brooklyn, New York, arising from events in Brooklyn. For the following reasons, this action is transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

DISCUSSION

Under the general venue statute, a civil action may be brought in

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . .; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

For venue purposes, a "natural person" resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and an "entity with the capacity to sue and be sued" resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2).

Venue of Plaintiff's claims does not appear to be proper in this district, under Section 1391(b)(1), based on the residence of defendants. Plaintiff lists addresses for all defendants in Brooklyn, and it therefore is not clear that any defendant resides in this district.¹

Venue of Plaintiff's claims also does not appear to be proper in this district, under Section 1391(b)(2), based on the place where the events giving rise to the claims occurred. Plaintiff alleges that police officers from the 72nd Precinct in Brooklyn engaged in a traffic stop and searched his vehicle, in violation of his rights, and that he faces pending criminal charges in Brooklyn, in Kings County, New York. Kings County is within the Eastern District of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 112(c). Because the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred Kings County, venue is proper under Section 1391(b)(2) in the Eastern District of New York.

Even if venue is proper in the district where a case is filed, a court may transfer the case "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice" to any other district where it might have been brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following factors: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum's familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff's choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. *Keitt v. N.Y. City*, 882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); *see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc.*, 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors). A

¹ Plaintiff appears to provide addresses where defendants are employed, but it is the address where individual defendants are domiciled that is relevant for venue purposes. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1).

plaintiff's choice of forum is accorded less deference where the plaintiff does not reside in the

chosen forum and the operative events did not occur there. See Iragorri v. United Tech. Corp.,

274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001).

Under Section 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate in this case. The underlying

events occurred in Brooklyn, where all defendants seem to be located, and it is reasonable to

expect that all relevant documents and witnesses also would be in Brooklyn. The Eastern District

of New York thus appears to be a more convenient forum for this action. Accordingly, the Court

transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 28

U.S.C. § 1404(a); see D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006) ("District

courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and

notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.").

CONCLUSION

The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of New York. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further

without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons

shall not issue from this Court. This order closes the case in the Southern District of New York.

The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore *in forma pauperis* status is denied for the purpose of an

appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

Dated:

April 15, 2025

New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

Chief United States District Judge

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